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1. The U.K. Buyout Market 
 
  Buyout markets in the U.K. and Continental Europe have developed substantially 
over  the  past  25  years.  The  European  market  appears  to  be  entering  its  third  period  of 
significant growth, following the waves of buyouts during the latter halves of the 1980s and 
1990s. In recent years, successive records have been set in terms of both individual deal size 
and the total market value of transactions in a given year. In 1997, for example, the U.K. 
market broke the £10 billion barrier for the first time. Only three years later, in 2000, more 
than £20 billion worth of deals were completed. The first European deal larger than £3 billion, 
the buyout of MEPC by Leconport, was completed in 2000. And 2005 saw the closing of the 
20,000th transaction in the combined UK-European buyout market since the late 1970s, when 
the first recognizably “modern” LBOs appeared in the U.S. and U.K. 
  With a few notable exceptions such as France and the Netherlands, buyout markets in 
Continental Europe did not materialize in earnest until around 1996.  As can be seen in Panel 
A of Table 1, the growth in the number of buyout deals in the U.K. and Continental Europe 
from 1996 through 2005 has been steady if unspectacular (with the weak European stock 
markets of 2000-2004 appearing to have dampened activity). Although the U.K. has by far the 
most active of these markets, there has also been considerable buyout activity in France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands.  Panel B shows a more striking evolution in 
terms of value:  During the past 10 years (1996-2005), the combined value of all buyouts in 
Europe rose more than fivefold and broke through the Euro 100 billion mark in 2005.   
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
  In the U.K. at least, the buyout market has become a significant part of the takeover 
market, accounting for half of all acquisitions by value in 2005, as compared to less than 20% 
two decades earlier. U.K. buyouts have also consistently produced the highest rates of return for 
investors among all the various sectors of the overall private equity (PE) market, which includes 
early-stage and later-stage venture capital (VC) as well as buyouts.  But for all its successes in 
the past 10 years, the U.K. buyout market in particular now faces a number of formidable 
challenges—notably, finding new deals at attractive prices while competing with new market 
entrants, devising lower-cost ways to fund deals, and effecting timely exits capable of producing 
targeted rates of return.    
  In this article, we provide a backward look at market developments for buyouts in the 
U.K. and Continental Europe and then close by considering the prospects for such markets. 
Because the U.K. is the most developed buyout market in Europe, we start with an overview of  
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the research on all major aspects and stages of the buyout lifecycle, including fund-raising, deal 
sourcing, deal structuring, offer premiums, exit mechanisms, and returns. Then, after noting the 
salient features of the largest buyout markets in Continental Europe, we conclude with a brief 
discussion of the challenges confronting the buyout market as a whole. 
 
2.0 The U.K. Buyout Market 
 
The development of the U.K. buyout market into its present state can be viewed as 
taking place in five distinct phases.
1 Although there have been buyout-like deals stretching 
back to the 19th century, the first phase of the modern buyout market in the U.K. began in the 
early 1980s (see Figure 1), roughly the same time as the U.S. market got its start.  During the 
deep recession in the U.K. in 1979-82, many of the first deals involved failed companies or 
firms restructuring to avoid failure. The relaxing in 1981 of the prohibition on companies 
providing financial assistance, that is security for debt, to purchase their own shares reduced 
the  barriers  faced by  lenders in  obtaining  security  for  the  funds  they  advanced.  And  the 
introduction of a secondary tier stock market in 1980 (the Unlisted Securities Market) opened 
up possibilities for realizing exit gains from smaller buyouts.    
       
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
  The second phase in the development of the U.K. buyout market comprised the rapid 
market growth from the mid-1980s to the end of the decade. The buyouts transacted during 
this period were increasingly the result of corporate refocusing strategies, and a first peak in 
the  value  of  deals  was  reached in  1989.  Such transactions,  which  generally  included  the 
existing management and were thus dubbed “management buyouts,” or MBOs, offered an 
alternative disposal route to a trade sale to a third party. Buyouts, such MBOs, were especially 
attractive in cases where the selling company wanted a speedy low-profile sale or when there 
were few external bidders for the business. 
  In addition to the many MBOs, the late 1980s saw large numbers of “management buy-
ins”  (MBIs),  transactions  in  which  private  equity  firms  (or,  in  some  cases,  institutional 
investors) brought in their own management teams to run the purchased businesses. The advent 
of specialist private equity and mezzanine funds, along with entry by U.S. banks starting in 
the mid-1980s, helped fund the development of MBIs as well as MBOs.  
  The third phase of U.K. buyout development, which began with the recession of the 
early 1990s, involved the restructuring of many of the largest transactions of the previous 
phase along with a return to the smaller buyouts that characterized the first half of the ’80s. 
As in the U.S., both the number and value of U.K. MBIs fell sharply as it became clear that 
many of the highly leveraged deals completed during the late ’80s—often premised on major 
asset sales or “unbundling of assets”—were having problems servicing their debt. The recession 
exacerbated these problems and made turnarounds longer and more difficult. Many foreign 
                                                       
1 M. Wright, B. Chiplin, K. Robbie and M. Albrighton (2000), “The Development of an Organizational 
Innovation: Management Buyouts in the U.K. 1980-1997,” Business History, 42, 137-184. 
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banks abandoned the buyout market, and those banks that remained active tightened their terms 
and covenants. Both private equity and debt providers were heavily involved in restructuring the 
problem cases in their portfolios, and some of the latter disbanded their lending teams that 
specialized in buyout type transactions.  
The end of the recession in 1994 saw the emergence of a fourth phase of U.K. buyout 
activity—one that saw rapid growth in total transaction value, which reached a new peak in 
2000. At the same time, though, a focus by private equity investors on larger transactions kept 
the total number of buyouts to drop from exceeding their “local peak” of 709 reached in 1997 
until six years later in 2003.  Along with a modest contraction in the number of deals in 1998 
and 1999, the years after 2000 saw a sharp plunge in the total value of new deals in the wake 
of the collapse of the dot.com boom and its repercussions. 
But a major resurgence in the value of the U.K. buyout market began in 2004, the 
start of the current phase five.  In 2005, there were a record-high 49 buyouts with purchase 
prices in excess of £100 million, and the total value of deals also set a new record of £24.2 
billion.  A preliminary look at statistics in the first half of 2006 suggests a slow start to the 
year, raising questions about challenges to the market to which we return below. (For a more 
detailed overview of the major events in the evolution of the U.K. buyout market over the 
past 20 years, see Table 2). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
2.1 Raising Funds  
 
  Fund-raising in the U.K. has evolved significantly over time and recently jumped to a 
record  high  of  £18.6  billion  ($24  billion)  in  2005.  During  the  period  2000-2003,  the  total 
amount raised by buyout funds in both the U.K. and Continental Europe exceeded the amount 
invested in each year. But, as can be seen in Table 3, this trend was reversed in 2004, when the 
amounts invested exceeded funds raised by a considerable margin.    
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
  In the U.K., the trend among buyout firms has been to raise fewer, larger funds, each 
with more capital than the last. While persuaded of the attractions of private equity as an asset 
class,  institutional  investors  in  the  U.K.  (pension  funds,  mutual  funds,  and  insurance 
companies) have indicated that they are likely to reduce their investments in all types of 
private equity in the future. At the same time, they also say that their investments specifically 
in buyouts will grow in importance as a percentage of their total commitment to private 
equity. By contrast, evidence from Continental Europe indicates an intent by institutional 
investors to increase their commitments to investment in all forms of private equity, including 
buyouts. 
  In addition to the funds raised and invested within Europe, in recent years U.S. private 
equity firms have become much more prominent investors in European buyout markets. The 
investment in U.K. firms by U.S. private equity funds increased from £1.6 billion in 1999 to  
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£5.3  billion  in  2005  (Figure  2).  Among  the  explanations  offered  for  such  international 
expansion by U.S. PE firms are the increased competitiveness of the U.S. buyout market and 
hence declining returns on U.S. deals; the reduced appetite of institutional investors for early-
stage funds since the end of the dot.com era; and greater opportunities for restructuring in the 
U.K. and, especially, Continental Europe.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
  The  hedge  funds  that  have  recently  emerged  in  the  U.K.  are  now  providing  an 
additional source of investment funds in the buyout market. In the last year or so, hedge fund 
returns have not been as high as those of buyout funds and, presumably as a result, last year 
more new money went into private equity than into hedge funds. Hedge fund managers are 
now pushing into less liquid markets, such as taking controlling positions in mid-cap stocks, 
which is the traditional territory of private equity firms. Increased competition for traditional 
private  equity  players  has  also  come  from  new  entrants  such  as  government-sponsored 
operators  like  Dubai  International,  family  offices,  and  wealthy  entrepreneurs.  In  the  first 
quarter of 2006, such relatively new investor groups] led 33% of all transactions over £100 
million, as compared to only 8% of these larger deals during the whole of 2005, and none at 
all in 2001. 
 
2.2  Sourcing Deals 
 
There are a number of common sources of management buyouts.  As can be seen in 
Figure 3, the main source of U.K. buyouts have been divestments of divisions or subsidiaries 
by listed U.K. companies.  Such divestment-induced buyouts were especially prevalent in the 
late 1980s, when large U.K. conglomerates were frequently selling off non-core activities. 
This phenomenon was less in evidence in the second half of the 1990s, when buyouts were 
equally likely to come from sales of family-owned and other private companies.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
  Another important source of U.K. buyouts were the State sector privatizations that 
gathered pace during the second half of the 1980s, leading to a sharp increase in management-
employee  buyouts.  In  such  cases,  the  specific  skills  of  the  incumbent  management  and 
employees were presumably believed to be key to the value of the business. 
A Privatization Success Story.  Inmarsat, the U.K. mobile satellite communications 
company, came into being as an intergovernmental organization (IGO) in 1979 to provide 
global  safety  and  other  communications  for  the  maritime  community.  Starting  with  a 
customer base of 900 ships in the early 1980s, it then grew rapidly to offer similar services to 
other users on land and in the air, until in 1999 it became the first IGO to be transformed into 
a private company.  
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Apax and Permira bought the company in December 2003 for £921 million. Their 
strategy was to continue to develop the company into the world’s leading mobile satellite 
communications company by continuing with plans to launch the Inmarsat-4 satellites and the 
next generation of high speed data and voice services--the Broadband Global Area Network 
(BGAN) service. The company was successfully floated on the London Stock Exchange in 
June  2005  for  a  market  capitalisation  of  £1120  million.  Inmarsat  now  supports  links  for 
phone, fax, and data communications to more than 287,000 ship, vehicle, aircraft and other 
mobile users and its BGAN service is now accessible across 85% of the world’s landmass and 
to 98% of the population. 
  As already noted, the late ’80s also saw a wave of management buy-ins, in which PE 
firms  sought  to  match  experienced  entrepreneurial  outside  managers  with  underperforming 
businesses in cases where poor internal management made a management buyout or a trade sale 
infeasible. The first buyouts of U.K. listed companies, known as public-to- private transactions 
(PTPs), also took place during the second half of the ’80s, in some cases in response to hostile 
bids.  And in 1989, a U.K. PE firm actually made a hostile bid for a listed public company (and 
won!)— the first of its kind in U.K. history. 
  Then, during the recession of the early 1990s, buyout acquirers benefited from a steady 
deal flow at a time when reductions in corporate profits led to divestments and limited the 
ability of established groups to make further acquisitions.  
  In  the  second  half  of  the  1990s,  the  pressure  to  maximize  shareholder  returns  in 
corporate divestiture programs  meant that the incumbent managers of subsidiaries were no 
longer seen as the preferred bidder, especially in larger transactions. This period saw the rise of 
investor-driven buyout acquisitions of subsidiaries, notably the so-called institutional buyout 
(IBO).
2 Additionally, as mentioned earlier, publicly listed family firms (as well as those in 
private hands) were a main source of buyout investments, reflecting the need of founding 
owners for successors and wealth diversification, as well as a greater effort by intermediaries 
and  financiers  to  target  these  kinds  of  companies,  given  the  increasing  difficulties  with 
divestment cases.  
  Since the late 1990s, the major changes in the relative prominence of different deal 
types have been the growth in importance of both secondary buyouts and public-to-private 
buyouts (PTPs), and the shift of attention to larger deals caused by the severe challenges in 
exiting  smaller  deals.    Although  private  equity  providers  had  previously  been  reluctant  to 
purchase companies from each other, the pressure for existing PE firms to obtain an exit due to 
the limited life of their funds helped them overcome their reluctance.  Much of the impetus for 
private equity providers to buy portfolio companies from other financial investors has come 
from the difficulties in finding attractive deals from other sources as corporate restructuring 
programs passed their peak and auctions pushed up prices. In fact, over a third of the total 
U.K. market value of buyouts is now accounted for by secondary buyouts. There were 91 
such buyouts in 2005, as compared to just 29 in 1995.  
  PTPs have developed over the life cycle of the market’s growth, starting somewhat later 
                                                       
2 A related development was the growth of leveraged build-ups (LBUs), an initial buyout type transaction 
to which further companies are added through a process of acquisition.  
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than general activity in 1985 and showing a marked resurgence during the second half of the 
1990s. Due to the high costs and risks associated with such deals, the first PTPs were relatively 
small  and  invariably  involved  incumbent  management.  But,  as  the  process  became  better 
understood and those initial deals were successfully completed, there was a growing tendency 
towards larger and investor-led or institutional buyouts (IBOs) of larger public companies. 
  This suggests that the opportunities to restructure listed corporations by taking them 
private may be greater than once thought. Both in terms of volumes and values, PTPs have been 
far more important in recent years than in the top deal years of the 1980s, reaching a peak in 
1999-2000,  and  then  easing  before  recovering  in  value  terms  in  2005  (Figure  4).  The 
Continental European trend has been similar. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 near here] 
 
2.3  The Financial Structure of Buyouts  
 
  In contrast to the U.S. experience, where buyouts represented a continuously large 
fraction of total private equity investing throughout the 1980s, U.K. buyouts during the ’80s 
started small and became increasingly important relative to the overall private equity market.
3  
One major contributor to the rise of the U.K. market was the significant entry by U.S. banks into 
the U.K. market, which boosted the provision of senior debt and mezzanine finance.  At the 
same time, a number of new specialist funds for investment in buyouts were launched in the 
U.K..  Although  domestic  U.K.  lenders  were  initially  reluctant  to  become  involved  in 
transactions  where  asset  sell-offs  were  necessary  to  repay  debt,  such  an  approach,  after 
successful applications by U.S. buyers, gradually became an accepted feature of the larger end 
of the U.K. market.  
  As deal size increased from the mid-1990s, so did financial innovation. Most important 
for the development of the larger end of the buyout market was the emergence, in March 1997, 
of a European subordinated high yield debt market  that was willing to fund buyouts. The initial 
demand for larger amounts of financing in larger U.K. buyouts could not be met with traditional 
senior debt or privately placed mezzanine. As a consequence, larger U.K. buyouts before 1997 
resorted to the U.S. high yield bond market. But, from 1997 onwards, U.K. financial institutions 
became  at  first  willing  and  then  eager  to  invest  in  high-yield,  non-amortizing  senior  debt 
instruments.
4  Such  instruments  enabled  buyout  financiers  to  operate  with  highly  leveraged 
capital  structures  but  without  creating  foreign  exchange  risks.  The  securitization  of  such 
leveraged loans, already popular in the U.S. buyout market, also gained momentum in the U.K. 
and Continental Europe during this period. 
  The proportion of debt in U.K. buyouts has varied considerably over the past 20 years. 
While the percentage of debt in buyout deals peaked in the late 1980s in the U.K. and sharply 
declined in the early 1990s, the recent decline in interest rates has been associated with a 
relative increase in leverage ratios.  In the average deal transacted in 2005, debt represented 
                                                       
3 Accounting for more than half of U.K. PE investments since 1987. 
4 As a reaction to the ruling environment of low nominal yields and the dampening of volatility in 
traditional asset classes  
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51% of the purchase price (Figure 5). 
 
[Insert Figure 5 near here] 
 
  The  number of equity,  mezzanine,  and  debt  providers  that  participate in any  one 
buyout  has  also  changed  over  time.  In  the  early  years  (1985-89),  when  the  market  was 
immature, broad syndication was more common. The top ten buyouts during this period were 
funded  by,  on  average,  ten  equity  providers,  eleven  debt  providers,  and  two  mezzanine 
providers.  These  high  numbers  reflected  the  desire  to  spread  the  risks  of  the  relatively 
smaller, less experienced fund providers that comprised the market at the time. But, as the 
U.K. buyout market has matured, the number of providers involved in buyouts has fallen. For 
example, in the ten largest buyouts over the period 2001-2005, there were, on average, three 
equity providers, four debt providers, and one mezzanine provider. But even so, as the deals 
keep getting larger, so does the number of equity providers that make up the consortia.  
 
2.4  Buyout Bids and Probable Sources of Value Added 
 
To gain control of a buyout target, investors usually pay a premium over its going-
concern market value. While this premium cannot generally be observed for private companies, 
studies of PTP transactions have shown large abnormal gains for the selling shareholders when 
an LBO is announced.
5 The premium is traditionally calculated as the difference between the 
last price traded before the delisting and the pre-announcement price of the firm. Usually, the 
pre-announcement price is taken some weeks (or months) prior to the first announcement in 
order to control for market “anticipation,” which may drive prices upwards following insider 
trading or trading on rumors. 
As reported in Table 4, a reasonable estimate of the average premiums paid to selling 
shareholders in LBOs is around 45%. Our recent study of U.K. PTPs during the period 1997-
2003 found an average premium of 41% (with the pre-announcement price measured one 
month  prior  to  the  announcement).  The  share  price  reaction  on  the  day  of  the  PTP 
announcements was a positive 30%.
6    
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
How can the private equity buyers in such deals feel comfortable offering 30-40% 
premiums, especially when their own investors are looking for returns on the order of 15-25% 
per annum?  A number of arguments have been offered to explain such large anticipated 
gains.
7 While there are some similarities between U.S. and U.K. sources of value creation in 
                                                       
5  Michael  C.  Jensen,  “The  Modern  Industrial  Revolution,  Exit,  and  the  Failure  of  Internal  Control 
Systems,” Journal of Finance 48 (1993), 831-880. 
6 L. Renneboog, T. Simons, and M. Wright, “Leveraged Public to Private Transactions in the UK,” 
Working paper ECGI and Tilburg University, 2005.  
7 For an overview see L. Renneboog and T. Simons (2005), Public to private transactions: Motives, 
trends, theories and empirical literature on LBOs, MBOs, MBIs and IBOs, Discussion paper CentER, 
Tilburg University.  
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LBOs, there are also some important differences. 
Consistent with most studies of U.S. LBOs, studies of pre-transaction shareholders in 
the U.K. PTPs suggest that part of the value created by taking public companies private may 
be  attributable  to  the  market’s  undervaluation  of  the  firm.  Especially  since  the  1990s, 
according to statements by CEOs of firms going private and in terms of a deterioration in a 
PTP firm’s share price relative to comparable firms that remain public, an important driver of 
U.K.  PTP  deals  appears  to  be  the  incumbent  management’s  belief  that  the  market  has 
incorrectly valued the company’s prospects.
8 Another argument is that going private enables 
management to realize perceived opportunities that could not be exploited while being listed.  
The potential for increased incentive alignment in the private firm also seems to be an 
important source of value creation in PTPs and, presumably, in buyouts and private equity of 
all  kinds.    The  operating  managers  in  such  companies  typically  are  given  or  asked  to 
purchase, significant grants of stock or options.  And the fact that the private firm’s board of 
directors is made up of its largest investors suggests a much more vigorous and effective 
monitoring process.  Lending additional support to this argument, U.K. studies of U.K. PTPs 
also suggest that firms with outside blockholders, reap smaller benefits from going private. 
This is consistent with the idea that in firms monitored by this type of outside shareholder, 
there is less scope for operating performance improvements following the PTP transaction.
9 
In contrast to studies of U.S. LBOs, studies of U.K. PTPs suggest that the reduction 
of the corporate tax bill potentially accomplished by high leverage is not a significant motive 
to take a listed company private. Nor do U.K. deals appear designed to manage a corporate 
free cash flow problem—a conclusion reached by most studies of U.S. buyouts as well. But 
there  is  some  evidence  that  the  costs  of  maintaining  a  listing  could  be  motivating  some 
companies to go private. What’s more, since the indirect costs of a listing—in the form, say, 
of management time spent on investor relations--are almost certainly much higher than the 
direct costs, it may be worth focusing more attention on this motive.  
Our study shows that, in a sample of 182 U.K. PTPs over the period 1997-2003, only 
five firms were in financial distress before the transaction and required concessions from their 
banks for the continuation of their operations. In three of these five cases, the banks had 
actually announced that they were terminating their investments, thus forcing these firms to 
seek a new life-line. Since the bidders in these transactions have to supply the company with 
additional funds and assume a high risk of failure, they usually pay a discount to the going-
concern market value.
10  
                                                       
8 C. Weir, D. Laing, and M. Wright (2005a), ‘Incentive effects, monitoring mechanisms and the threat 
from the market for corporate control: an analysis of the factors affecting public to private transactions 
in the UK’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32, 909-944; Weir, C., D. Laing and M. 
Wright (2005b), ‘Undervaluation, private information, agency costs and the decision to go private’, 
Applied Financial Economics, 15, 947-961. 
9  Evidence  also  shows  that  PTPs  have  -  before  they  go  private  -  higher  concentrations  of  insider 
ownership, on average, and tend to separate the functions of CEO and Chair of the board more often 
(as suggested by the Combined Code). Weir et al. ibid. 
10 For example, starting in 1995 Industrial Control Services underwent a major restructuring and a new 
management team consolidated the firm’s technological position after 1997. Nevertheless, the financial 
position continued to deteriorate as the firm was too small to function in a market dominated by large 
competitors. The management could not rely on the continuing support of the banks over the long term  
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PTPs are costly to undertake and the risk that a bid will fail is significant.  In the 
U.K., private equity bidders for listed companies may use irrevocable commitments, legally 
binding promises by shareholders to sell to the buyout bidder, both to ensure the success of a 
PTP proposal and to discourage a bidding contest that would potentially reduce their returns 
from the investment.
11 Irrevocable commitments are widely used in U.K. PTPs:  23.40% of a 
sample of 155 PTPs completed in the period 1998-2003 gained up to 20% irrevocables, and 
some 60% achieved at least 50% support from shareholders prior to the bid announcement.
12 
Private equity firms use their expertise to obtain higher irrevocable commitments to the deal 
from significant shareholders in order to persuade the target firm to accept the bidder’s bid 
before the offer is made public. This approach is especially relevant when the incumbent 
management holds significant stakes and existing institutional shareholders are locked in to 
holding  shares  in  the  company.  As  already  suggested,  the  announcement  of  irrevocable 
commitments  may  make  other  potential  bidders  less  likely  to  enter  the  contest  with  an 
alternative bid since the commitment ensures that, without any higher alternative bid, the 
agreement  to  sell  the  share  becomes  binding,  although  a  higher  bid  can  still  undo  the 
commitment  if  it  is  a  so-called  ‘soft’  irrevocable.  Research  on  irrevocable  commitments 
suggests  that  investors  proposing  a  PTP  are  more  likely  to  gain  the  backing  of  other 
shareholders the greater the bid premium and the more reputable the private equity backer as 
indicated by the extent of their PTP activity.
13  
 
2.5  Exit Mechanisms and Returns from Buyout Investments 
 
Studies  of  the  longevity  of  buyouts  suggests  that  private  equity  firms  are  under 
significant pressure to achieve their target returns and hence work towards a timely exit.
14 As a 
consequence, besides more intense monitoring of their portfolio companies, PE firms are also 
likely to use exit-related equity-ratchets on management' s equity stakes. As can be seen in 
Figure 6, the most common type of exit has varied somewhat over the life of the U.K. buyout 
market. Sales to corporate buyers, or “trade sales” as they are typically called, have generally 
                                                                                                                                                        
and was not able to do another equity issue. Therefore, the board asked some investment banks to seek 
an interested party to acquire the firm or some parts. The board decided to support the offer from 
Alchemy Partners in order to assure short-term solvency. They took the firm private in an IBO at an 
85% discount on the last quoted share price before the announcement of the offer, at 1 pence. 
11 Irrevocable commitments involve legally binding promises given by existing shareholders to agree to 
sell their shares to the bidder before the bid is announced. In the UK, the City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers includes both rules concerning the conduct of management buyouts of listed corporations and 
restrictions relating to irrevocable commitments in terms of the number of shareholders that can be 
approached  to  obtain  irrevocable  commitments,  the  prohibition  of  favorable  treatment  for  those 
offering irrevocable commitments without Takeover Panel consent, and the disclosure of irrevocable 
commitments. Irrevocable commitments are thus part of the public bid process. While they may not 
formally be given until just before a bid is announced, obtaining them involves private actions by the 
bidder prior to the bid being announced.   
12Wright,  M.,  C.  Weir  and  A.  Burrows  (2006),  ‘Irrevocable  Commitments  and  Going  Private’, 
European Financial Management, forthcoming  
13 ibid. 
14 Wright M, K. Robbie, S. Thompson and K. Starkey (1994), ' Longevity and the life cycle of MBOs' , 
Strategic Management Journal, 15, 215-227. 
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been the most common form of exit in the U.K., accounting for about a third of all exits during 
the recessionary period 1990-1994 (when receivership was an even more common end) and for 
close to 50% during the latter half of the ’90s. 
 
The  Case  of  Bols:  Creating  Value  through  Trade  Sales.    Bols,  founded  in 
Amsterdam in 1575, had become the Bols Royal Distilleries division of Dutch food group 
Royal Bols Wessanen NV by the time it was sold to CVC Capital Partners Ltd. in 1998 for 
￿185 million. That move marked the end of a five-year effort to combine Wessanen foods 
with Bols drinks. Under the CVC umbrella, Bols bought the Metaxa and Asbach brands in 
1999 from Diageo PLC, the world' s biggest liquor company, which at the time was slimming 
its huge portfolio to focus on a core group of nine global brands. France' s second largest 
liquor  and  wine  company,  Remy  Cointreau  S.A.,  wanting  to  participate  in  industry 
consolidation, agreed to buy Bols Royal Distilleries for ￿510 million in August 2000 just two 
years after the buy-out. 
 
 For  the  largest,  most  successful  buyout  portfolio  companies,  however,  the  most 
popular choice is likely to be an Initial public offering (IPO). This was the choice in roughly a 
third of the exits in the second half of the 1980s. But since then, the percentage of exits through 
IPOs has fallen sharply, from about 10% in the 1990s to 5% during the last five years. 
The total value of exits reached a record of £18 billion in 2004 and remained high at 
£15 billion in 2005.  This is more than twice the total value of exits that took place a decade 
earlier.  
 
[Insert Figure 6 near here] 
 
Secondary  buyouts—sales  of  portfolio  firms  from  one  PE  firm  to  another—  have 
gained in importance since their start in the early 1990s, and they now account for almost a third 
of all exits. A number of factors have contributed to financial investors’ decisions to sell their 
portfolio firms to other PE firms. Chief among them are (1) difficulties in exiting buyouts 
through  IPOs;  (2) the  reduced acquisition  appetite of  corporations (especially  for  smaller 
deals), which appear increasingly intent on achieving  greater focus; and (3) the need for 
private  equity  firms  to  exit  from  deals  when  their  funds  are  nearing  the  ends  of  their 
contractual lives. The record levels of U.K. exit values in 2004 and 2005 were driven largely 
by major exits through secondary buyouts. 
An increasing number of buyouts have had several subsequent private equity owners 
(sometimes referred to as “tertiary” or “quaternary” buyouts). At the end of 2005, a total of 41 
companies had gone through at least three buyouts. Such companies tend to be mid-sized cash 
generators in mature sectors that can be easily releveraged.  
 
The Case of Sirona Dental Systems:  A Tertiary Buyout.  Sirona Dental Systems, 
headquartered in Bensheim, Germany, manufactures dental equipment for clinics and dental 
laboratories worldwide and has been the subject of three buyouts. The first took place in 
1997, when the company was bought by Permira from Siemens for ￿460 million. In 2003,  
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EQT Partners bought the company from Permira for ￿418 million.  Finally, in 2005, the 
company was sold as a secondary buyout to Madison Dearborn Partners for ￿800 million, 
with  debt  provided  by  JP  Morgan.  Sirona  had  performed  well  with  EQT  and  a  strong 
European business plan had been implemented. With Madison Dearborn at the helm, they aim 
to focus on the U.S. market and further develop their global strategy. 
 
Performance of IPOs.   
Studies show that IPOs of U.K. buyouts result in positive and highly significant first 
day returns to IPO buyers. MBOs that are (at least) partly controlled by private equity firms 
are more underpriced than MBOs without private equity investors.
15 However, there is no 
difference in the long-run, post-IPO performance of either type of MBO.   
Venture-backed MBOs in the U.K. tend to go public at an earlier stage than their non-
venture  backed  counterparts.  PTP  MBOs  in  the  U.K.  that  are  backed  by  more  reputable 
private equity firms tend to exit through IPO earlier and to perform better than those backed 
by less prestigious private equity firms.
16 
 
Returns.   
Private equity returns have been declining in recent years, which is not surprising 
considering the negative trend in the stock market over the period 2000-2004, the higher 
competition  for  deals,  and  the  prevalence  of  auctions.  But  even  so,  the  fund-level  data 
published  by  national  venture  capital  associations  and  the  European  Venture  Capital 
Association (EVCA) consistently show that the internal rates of return (IRRs) on buyout 
funds outperform both the two other main categories of private equity funds: early-stage and 
all-stage venture capital funds. 
A study (involving one of the current writers) using firm-level data on 321 exited 
buyouts in the U.K. during the period 1995-2004 reports that the average buyout company 
earned an IRR of 22.2% on its total Enterprise Value (debt plus equity) and that its average 
equity IRR was 70.5%.
17 IPO exits, as expected, outperformed trade sales and secondary 
buyouts.  Larger  buyouts--those  with  an  initial  transaction  value  above  £100  million--had 
greater returns than medium-sized or smaller buyouts. The study further provides evidence 
that the monitoring and incentive effects associated with larger managerial equity stakes are a 
major contributor to the increases in enterprise value. (But, interestingly enough, this effect 
reverses when management controls the majority of the equity, a phenomenon limited to very 
small buyouts that fall below the target size range of most financial sponsors.) In the average 
U.K.  buyout,  the  study  also  finds  that  leverage  and  interest  coverage  are  also  positively 
related to the rates of return value increases.  
 
Refinancings and Partial Sales.   
                                                       
15 Jelic, R., B. Saadouni and M. Wright (2005), ‘Performance of private to public MBOs:  the role of 
venture capital’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 32, 643-682. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Nikoskelainen, E., and Wright, M., “The Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms on Value 
Increase in Leveraged Buyouts” CMBOR Occasional Paper (2006).  
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In  recent  years,  with  the  traditional  forms  of  exit  proving  somewhat  difficult, 
refinancings and partial sales have become a popular way for private equity houses to cash 
out part of their investment while at the same time keeping control of their portfolio company. 
There are two common methods of exiting through refinancing. First, the private equity house 
can refinance a business they own by having it borrow more and then paying themselves 
special  dividends  from  the  borrowings.  Alternatively,  the  PE  firm  can  sell  some  of  its 
property  assets  to  a  third  party  (for  example,  to  an  insurance  company),  lease  back  the 
property, and transfer the proceeds from the sale to the PE firm in the form of a dividend.  In 
2005, the total refinancings accounted for almost a third of the total value realized in the 
U.K., as compared to a little over a tenth in 1997 (see Table 5). 
A partial sale of the portfolio company provides another means of realizing part of 
the initial investment without losing control. These sales made up just under a third of the 
total value realized in the U.K. in 2001, when the value of the FTSE 100 fell sharply, but have 
since become less popular and now account for less than 10% of the total. 
 
A German Case of Partial Sale. The Moeller Group, headquartered in Bonn, is one 
of  Germany’s  largest  and  longest-established  privately  owned  industrial  and  buildings 
electronic component producers. After the company suffered a downturn in performance in 
2000-2002, it was bought in 2003 for ￿49 million by Advent International, which aimed to 
use  the  buyout  structure  to  create  a  platform  for  successful  growth  and  enhanced 
competitiveness. The existing management team were joined by two new board members 
from Advent and a restructuring plan was implemented. Advent turned an underperforming 
business into a profitable one in about two years and partially exited their investment by 
selling a 75% stake to Doughty Hanson in 2005, in a secondary buy-out, for ￿1.1 billion.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Financial distress represents, of course, a forced exit. Over the last 20 years, there have 
been 12,267 U.K. buyouts, of which 1,431, or about 12%, have so far entered protection from 
creditors.
18  The  high  leverage  in  LBOs  means,  of  course,  that  financial  default  will  occur 
sooner, and with greater frequency, than in firms with lower gearing.  And for this reason, we 
would expect significantly higher recovery rates for creditors.  In U.K. buyouts that defaulted, 
secured creditors recovered on average about 60% of their investment.  And, as happened in the 
U.S., many of these companies were eventually restructured and sold as going concerns.
19  
 
                                                       
18 In the U.K. system, this process is known as receivership. The receivership rates varies according to 
vintage  year,  peaking  at  21%  for  buyouts  completed  in  the  boom  years  of  1988-1990  which 
subsequently encountered problems in the recession of the early 1990s (see CMBOR, Management 
Buyouts Quarterly Review, Autumn 2005 Table A39 p.73). The failure rate of buyouts completed 
during the first half of the 1990s was approximately 12% by Sept. 2005. 
19 D. Citron, M. Wright, R. Ball and F. Rippington, “Secured Creditor Recovery Rates from Management 
Buyouts in Distress,” European Financial Management 9 (2003), 141-162. Approximately a fifth were 
sold as outright going concerns. 
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3.0 Buyouts in Continental Europe 
 
  Despite  the  growth  in  U.K.  and  Continental  European  markets  noted  earlier,  the 
maturity  of  the  different  buyout  markets  varies  markedly.  One  common  indicator  of  the 
relative  maturity  of  buyout  market  is  the  ratio  of  the  value  of  buyout  transactions  to  a 
country’s GDP. As can be seen in Figure 7, the U.K. and the Netherlands have the largest 
buyout markets as a proportion (about 1.5%) of their GDP, while the French and German 
markets appear to be about half that size. Spain and Italy have relatively undeveloped buyout 
markets, representing only about 0.5% of GDP.  
 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
 
Table 6 compares the factors influencing the development of private equity-backed 
buyouts in four different markets that are representative of the different stages of maturity 
observed in European private equity markets. As mentioned above, the U.K. represents the 
most mature market, with France closely following. Germany represents the less developed, 
though large, European PE economies, and CEE is representative of the largely undeveloped, 
emerging markets.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
As  summarized  in  Panels  A  of  Table  6,  there  are  important  differences  among 
countries in terms of the supply of buyout opportunities. For example, in the U.K. most 
opportunities  have  come  from  the  restructuring  of  diversified  groups,  with  going  private 
transactions becoming more important only in recent years. In France, by contrast, the marked 
growth in buyouts has been driven mainly by succession and portfolio reorganization issues in 
the large number of family controlled listed and unlisted companies. But even so, divestments 
by French corporations, in response to growing competitive pressures and an increasing focus 
on corporate governance and shareholder value, have recently become a major part of the 
French private equity market. 
 
Profiting  from  Divestment.    In  March  2002,  CDC  Equity  Capital  acquired 
Européenne de Stationnement, France’s second largest car park operator, as part of a ￿100m 
($88.4m) buyout from Groupe Fabricom, a construction subsidiary of French water utility 
Suez Lyonnais des Eaux. Européenne de Stationnement was sold to CDC along with Cabinet 
Villa, the second largest residential property management company in Paris, with a real estate 
portfolio  valued  at  roughly  ￿20m.  Xavier  Thoumieux,  a  partner  at  CDC  Equity  Capital 
responsible for the deal, planned to sell the real estate portfolio and develop Cabinet Villa 
before selling it on to another financial sponsor or strategic partner. Both Européenne de 
Staionnement and Cabinet Villa generate strong cash flow and yield attractive contracts. In 
France, the markets for both car park operators and property management have yet to be 
consolidated and provide good buyout opportunities for financial buyers. 
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 By contrast, in countries like Germany, Spain, and Italy, the reluctance of founders 
of small and medium-sized firms to sell to private equity firms—or to cede control at all—has 
restricted market growth. As a result, divestments and secondary deals have been the most 
important sources of buyouts in these countries. In CEE, the transition from communism has 
been the main source of opportunities as many state-owned firms were privatized, though 
these  volumes  have  steadily  declined  in  recent  years.  The  overall  Continental  European 
market for PTP transactions is still small, in part because these countries have far fewer listed 
companies in the first place. Culture may also play a role in this, with managers in some 
countries apparently expressing such pride in their listings to even consider going private.  
Panel B of Table 6 attempts to summarize aspects of the “demand” side of the buyout 
market,  particularly  cross-country  differences  in  attitudes  to  entrepreneurial  risk  and  the 
willingness of managements to undertake buyouts. The most notable finding here is that U.K. 
managers appear much more inclined to take risks than managers in Continental European 
countries. The  most  important  exception  to  this  generalization  is  France,  where  the  recent 
growth in buyouts seems to have been fueled in part by a more entrepreneurial culture. In 
contrast, the willingness of German managers to undertake buyouts has traditionally been 
low, but this appears to be changing as a high number of corporate restructurings reduces the 
security of managerial tenure.   
The “infrastructure” for doing buyout deals also differs significantly across countries. 
As can be seen in Panel C, the U.K. has more developed private equity and debt markets, better 
intermediary  networks,  and  more  favorable  legal  and  taxation  frameworks.  Nevertheless, 
changes  are  underway  in  the  other  countries  to  improve  their  institutional  and  regulatory 
infrastructure. The French private equity industry grew rapidly from the mid-1980s, with law 
firms  playing  a  particularly  important  role  in  the  diffusion  of  the  buyout  concept.  The 
infrastructure  to  complete  German  deals  was  for  a  long  time  less  than  favourable--few 
intermediaries, an underdeveloped private equity market, and high rates of taxation. Many of 
these restrictions did not begin to ease until the mid-1990s, when, for example, the country’s 
punitive capital gains tax regime relating to share disposals began to be relaxed.  
Finally, we considered cross-country differences in exit routes and their importance to 
private equity firms in realizing the value of their buyout investments. As summarized in Panel 
D of Figure 6, there are notable differences among  countries in the extent to which stock 
markets facilitate IPOs of buyout companies. One must begin by recognizing that even highly 
developed stock markets provide limited exit opportunities to all but larger, fastest-growing 
businesses. At the same time, as many corporations complete their restructuring and markets 
become more concentrated and global, the corporate M&A market provides less scope for the 
trade sale as an exit route, especially for smaller deals. As a result, secondary buyouts and buy-
in transactions have become a popular exit route for PE buyout investments in the U.K. market; 
and  they  are  likely  to  become  increasingly  important  in  other  markets  as  they  mature, 
particularly as companies  seek exits when both the stock and M&A  markets are weak.  In 
France, although the development of the Second Marché and the Nouveau Marché enlarged 
the possibility for the realization of value in buyout investments, partial sales have provided a 
frequent exit route for investors.  
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The Case of Autobahn Tank & Rest.  The secondary buyout of Autobahn Tank & Rest by 
Terra Firma for ￿1.1 billion was announced in 2004. For more than 50 years, Autobahn Tank 
& Rest has operated a network of filling stations, and service and catering sites throughout 
Germany.  The  company  had  performed  well  under  Allianz  Capital  Partners  and  Apax 
Partners, which funded the ￿961 million first buyout in 1998, and planned to realize their 
investment through an IPO on the Frankfurt stock exchange. But since the IPO would only 
have given shareholders a 40% exit, the selling PE firms chose the secondary buyout by Terra 
Firma, which provided a 100% exit. 
 
4.0 Prospects and Challenges 
 
  In  this  section,  we  present  the  challenges  and  prospects  now  facing  the  European 
private equity sector. We focus on the most pressing issues at the moment, including challenges 
in fund-raising, deal sourcing, structuring, bidding, and exit. 
 
4.1 Fund-raising: What are the implications of the current fund overhang? 
 
   Private equity fund-raising has reached record levels in the last five years, but the 
investment of funds has not kept pace. As a result, Europe is currently endowed with a fund 
overhang  estimated  at  roughly  $40  billion;
20  and  the  general  sentiment,  shared  by 
practitioners and academics alike, is that too much capital is chasing too few deals. With 
rising entry multiples, and many new entrants in the private equity industry in the last few 
years, this suggests the need for rationalization of the playing field and some consolidation of 
the industry. 
 
4.2 Deal-sourcing: How will private equity firms source their deals in the future? 
 
Data on buyouts of subsidiaries and parent-to-parent sales suggest that divestment 
activity by U.K. corporations has passed its peak.  However, as corporations continue to make 
acquisitions, opportunities for divestment buyouts are likely to remain--for example, in cases 
where post-acquisition integration issues are not adequately addressed, or senior managers 
fail  to  provide  compelling  incentivizes  for  the  management  of  the  new  subsidiaries  or 
divisions. And there still seems to be ample potential for restructuring larger corporations in 
Continental Europe.   
In the U.K. as well as Continental Europe, there also continue to be large numbers of 
family-owned firms, many with aging founders and little active succession planning.
21 A central 
issue in such firms is the founder’s expectation of future involvement with the business, 
which can play a major role in the negotiation of the deal, especially the price at which they 
are willing to sell. Owners of private businesses in the U.K. seem in general to be more 
                                                       
20 See e.g., Pricewaterhouse Coopers Global Private Equity 2004 for funds raised and invested between 
1998 and 2003 
21 Over a fifth of respondents to a recent CMBOR survey of buyouts of family firms have not done any 
succession planning.  
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willing both to sell and to cut their ties with their firms than their counterparts in Continental 
Europe.   
The  entry  of  hedge  funds  into  the  Continental  European  buyout  market  poses  a 
competitive challenge to private equity firms in terms of deal sourcing. The expectation is that 
hedge  funds’  investments may  trigger  restructuring  and  focus  on  cost  reduction  over  the 
relatively shorter term. To the extent this turns out to be correct, it raises doubt about hedge 
funds’ ability to build the longer-run “growth” value of the LBOs they invest in. Questions 
are also being raised about how hedge funds will behave when one of their LBO companies 
becomes financially distressed. Will they walk away or focus mainly on generating fees (at 
the expense of total value) when participating in recapitalizations? The presence of hedge 
funds thus also has implications for the approach adopted by existing debt providers in the 
market. 
Our  expectation  is that  different types  of  hedge  funds  will  emerge  with  different 
mandates and a focus on different types of buyouts. Securitization likely will become more 
prevalent, and its impact on the future buyout market could be far-reaching in terms of the 
size of deals that will be possible.  
 
4.3  Deal  structuring:  What  further  innovations  can  PE  firms  make  in  buyout 
structuring and financing?  
 
  The  majority  of  hedge  funds  active  in  the  leveraged  buyout  (LBO)  market  have 
focused so far on providing subordinated debt, such as second-lien and mezzanine debt, and 
payment-in-kind securities (PIKs). Thus, they may represent more serious competition for 
providers  of  mezzanine  and  junior  debt  than  the  private  equity  funds  themselves.  The 
emergence of alternative private equity providers at the top end of the market may bring more 
innovative and more flexible players with a lower cost of capital, but it remains to be seen 
whether they have the skills to generate the gains achieved by private equity firms.   
The resurgence of club deals has enabled syndicates of private equity firms to bid for 
very large buyouts that would otherwise be too risky to fund on their own. In addition to this 
risk-spreading rationale, they may also bring together the diverse specialist skills required to 
restructure and regenerate a particular deal.
22 However, club deals pose a number of potential 
problems.
23 Limited partners seeking to diversify their investments in private equity may be 
concerned when the different funds in which they invest are part of the same syndicate to 
complete a particular deal. Despite the presence of “drag along,” “come along,” and “tag 
along” provisions, coordination may be problematical when restructuring is required. Where 
these  syndicates  involve  partners  who  are  highly  experienced  players  in  the  market,  the 
potential for tensions when egos clash about strategy and restructuring seems clear.   
The emergence of second-lien bonds and loans, typically with fewer covenants than 
first-lien debt but sharing of collateral with senior debt providers, introduces the possibility of 
                                                       
22 For example, a generalist private equity firm may link with a second firm with specialist technology 
skills. 
23 Wright, M. and A. Lockett (2003), ‘The structure and management of alliances: syndication in 
venture capital investments’, Journal of Management Studies, 40, 2073-2104.   
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longer maturities and more attractive interest rates.  But such debt instruments may have the 
disadvantages of limiting future finance options by creating conflicts of interest between first- 
and second lien providers. In Europe, second-lien loans in buyouts are typically mezzanine 
debt.
24   
 
4.4 Buyout bid: Will bidding conditions for private equity firms change? 
 
Given  the  greater  prevalence  of  auctions,  record  levels  of  fund-raising,  and 
difficulties in identifying attractive new deals, it seems unlikely that PE firms will be able to 
acquire control of target companies at lower bid premiums than those observed to date. This 
fact, combined with the current high market valuations and entry multiples, as well as the 
institutionalized  pressure  on  PE  firms  to  invest,  raises  the  important  question  as  to  how 
buyout financiers will be able to generate sufficiently high returns to satisfy their investors 
three to ten years from now.  
Since facing limits on the further use of leverage as a value-creation mechanism is 
now common as well as pressure to generate high exit returns over the short to medium term, 
PE firms will have to make their buyout operations even more efficient. As a consequence, 
private equity firms will increasingly have to distinguish themselves through their operating 
capabilities and, perhaps, industry specialization.  
 
4.5 Exit: What further challenges does the advent of the secondary buyout pose? 
 
  The  recent record  growth  in secondary  buyouts  may  help  management  to remain 
independent  while  enabling  private  equity  firms  to  obtain  at  least  a  partial  exit.  For  the 
incoming investors, even though management has a proven track record, a major question 
needs to be answered: will managers be buyers or sellers in the deal? This raises a further 
number of issues. First, when the management team is seeking to increase their equity stake, 
there may be a corresponding reduction in control by the private equity firm. This may be 
problematical if it means that management are able to embark on risky growth strategies with 
little monitoring. When managements are able to realize significant gains, motivating them to 
perform in the subsequent deal may also be difficult. 
A  final,  unresolved  issue  about  secondary  buyouts  concerns  the  possibility  that 
limited partners will be asked by private equity firms to invest again in the same deal through 
a subsequent fund, and presumably at a higher price than the first time around. While exit 
from the first buyout allows the realization of capital gains, limited partners may take some 




  In  the  past  two  decades,  European  buyout  markets  have  continuously  adapted  to 
changing conditions, including challenges relating to deal sourcing, the entry of new players, 
                                                       
24 Issues remain to be resolved about the duration of the enforcement of standstill agreements and the 
extent of waiver of adequate protection rights by second-lien providers.  
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and the generation of returns. Competition for larger buyouts has forced prices higher, but 
with record amounts of capital raised in 2005, it seems that large deal flow will continue to 
grow over the coming years. With strong buying power at the disposal of specialized venture 
capital, private equity firms, and hedge funds, and with the growth of club buyouts, it may 
only be a matter of time before we see very large firms (even FTSE 100 companies) being 
taken private.  
With the higher profile of the private equity asset class enabling buyout funds to 
attract the best managers to run the target companies, banks have been more willing to gear 
up deals and even refinance them after a short period of time. Although this strategy involves 
significant  risks--and  growing  concerns  about  the  near-term  performance  of  European 
economies and trends in interest rates are beginning to raise questions about the degree of 
leverage in buyout deals--there is also potential for commensurately higher returns. 
The U.K. market has become quite mature and has one of the highest proportions of 
buyout values to GDP. If this remains at around 1.5 to 2%, as it has over the last several 
years, then the buyout market should grow at least in line with the U.K. economy. Elsewhere 
in Europe, pressures on larger corporations to restructure likely will lead to increased deal 
activity,  notably  divestments.  The  growing  number  of  large  secondary  buyouts  provides 
valuable liquidity for the buyout market at a time when exits have become difficult. Trade 
sale opportunities appear to be growing once again and stock markets have become more 
encouraging, which should help allay building concerns of institutional investors about the 
recycling of capital seen in recent years.   
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Table 1: Number and value of buyouts/buy-ins in Continental Europe (CE) and 
U.K. 1996-2005 
 




1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Austria  1  2  2  1  2  1  4  0  1  0 
Belgium  2  3  4  5  5  4  2  1  5  8 
Denmark  3  2  3  3  5  2  2  1  2  6 
Finland  1  3  6  3  2  3  4  5  5  6 
France  26  25  48  64  38  19  25  35  22  63 
Germany  17  21  22  18  15  21  8  11  17  22 
Ireland  1  3  4  2  3  5  4  5  4  2 
Italy  15  10  13  24  10  6  15  12  17  19 
Netherlands  14  13  20  18  15  7  9  8  9  14 
Norway  2  0  0  0  2  2  2  3  4  5 
Portugal  4  2  3  3  3  0  1  1  0  2 
Spain  3  8  20  11  10  12  11  11  9  22 
Sweden  5  6  8  7  4  2  6  6  5  13 
Switzerland  11  7  5  7  4  1  2  1  4  0 
Total (CE)  105  105  158  166  118  85  95  100  104  182 
UK  646  709  691  656  618  642  637  711  701  685 
Total (inc 
UK) 
751  814  849  822  736  727  732  811  805  867 
Source: CMBOR/Barclays Private Equity/Deloitte 
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Table 1: continued 
 




1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Austria  72  128  95  680  734  47  154  303  88  28 
Belgium  147  414  820  2,595  337  1,744  517  1,448  2,266  4,057 
Denmark  411  263  267  2,173  1,313  500  1,391  848  260  7,060 
Finland  724  440  560  1,085  675  1,047  480  1,039  977  2,044 
France  2,189  5,275  6,198  8,387  6,503  6,387  15,557  8,772  11,489  20,714 
Germany  1,704  3,538  5,265  4,629  15,084  7,229  8,143  11,908  17,915  11,727 
Ireland  116  119  244  1,475  259  5,021  4,930  747  970  770 
Italy  1,146  3,121  673  2,756  2,555  1,002  3,428  7,773  3,013  17,512 
Netherlands  1,001  1,059  3,528  2,906  1,856  4,433  1,870  4,958  7,612  10,256 
Norway  315  180  22  225  1,004  1,370  142  308  455  426 
Portugal  158  64  83  206  83  2  26  54  8  76 
Spain  227  374  859  1,715  941  1,528  2,069  934  2,274  9,391 
Sweden  700  1375  928  2,926  3,169  3,005  1,116  2,226  1,701  4,702 
Switzerland  1,316  2,426  1,347  1,013  1,772  715  2,766  864  1,570  563 
Total (CE)  10,226  18,776  20,889  32,771  36,285  34,030  42,589  42,182  50,598  89,326 
UK  12,555  17,114  23,273  26,864  38,349  31,343  24,844  23,570  30,144  35,406 
Total (inc 
UK) 
22,781  35,890  44,162  59,635  74,634  65,373  67,433  65,752  80,742  124,732 




Table 2: Management Buyouts 1986-2006: Major Highlights 
 
  UK  Continental Europe  
1986  Emergence of bought deals and US banks; 
First going private buyouts involving 
recommended offers (Gomme, Raybeck). First 
over £250 million U.K. Buyout Fund. 
CMBOR begins to record the deals across CE 
in earnest. There were 167 buyouts with a 
combined value of ￿1 billion. First PTP 
recorded in France and Sweden. 
1987  Emergence of large buyouts and growth of 
going privates; Privatisation buyouts record 
market share (10.3) per cent) and deal volume 
(32) but receivership buyouts record low at 0.6 
per cent; Strong growth in Western European 
market.  100
th buyout flotation. 
First investment in CE firms by US financiers 
(in France and Spain).  
1988  First mezzanine debt fund; buy-ins exceed 100 
deals and £1 billion value in a year for the first 
time; peak year for subsequent buy-in failure. 
First PTP in Denmark and the Netherlands. 
Market value exceeds ￿5 billion for first time. 
Beginning of first market boom due to rapid 
growth in the number and types of financiers 
and major growth in management buy-ins. 
1989  Emergence of hostile LBOs and unbundling; 
Record total deal value £7.5 billion.  First £2 
billion transaction (Isosceles).  First 500 MBIs; 
Record MBO trade sales; almost £1 billion 
raised for U.K. buyout specific funds. 
First investment in German buyout by US 
financier. First use of mezzanine by 3i 
(investment in Lignotock in Germany).  
1990  Collapse of large highly leveraged deal 
market; resurgence of smaller buyouts and 
those from receivership; record total 
buyout/buy-in deals volume (597) and of 
buyouts (486). U.K. interest rates at their 
highest. 
Deal numbers peak for the first time at 413. 
Europe-wide recession closes in. 
1991  Buyouts from receivership record 19.3%of 
deals; record failures of buyouts/buy-ins at 
124. 
A relatively quiet year for the buyout market 
with deals numbers falling compared to 
previous years to 336 and value falling 
similarly to ￿5.5 billion.  
1992  Buyouts and Buy-in account for record 57%of 
all takeovers and 35%of their value; 
Emergence of Eastern European Buyouts. 
First PTP in Germany. Surge in buyouts in 
Germany due privatizations by Treuhandanstalt 
post reunification. Basel I implemented in G-10 
countries (risk management in banking). First 
secondary buyout recorded by CMBOR. 
1993  500
th buyout recorded by CMBOR; Buyouts 
from receivership decline from earlier peak; 
Buyouts from U.K. parents reach record low of 
39 per cent; 200
th buyout flotation. 
Second highest number of privatizations across 
Europe. 
1994  Emergence of Serial Buyout/Buy-in 
Entrepreneurs. 
All-time Privatisation buyouts exceed 200.  
First 1,000 MBIs; record buyout fund raising; 
Record flotations of buyouts/buy-ins at 48. 
The number of buyouts from foreign parent 
divestments peaked for the first time at 74; 
those from privatizations fell from the year 
before but remained a significant source. 
1995  Emergence of Investor Buyouts (IBOs); Buy-
ins account for a record 36%of the buyout/ 
buy-in market; Buyouts of privately 
held/family businesses at record 40%of 
market; record trade sales of buyouts/buy-ins 
at 95; 10,000 buyouts recorded by CMBOR. 
The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) was 
introduced. 
SWX (Switzerland), the world’s first fully 
automated stock exchange, comes into 
operation.  
1996  Total buyout market at £7.8 billion exceeds 
previous 1989 record.  Buy-ins rise to a record 
55%of total M&A.  Rise of secondary buyouts 
and a new record for exits. 
The end of a Europe-wide recession leads to 
the second market boom and the buyout market 
begins to take off again. Market value exceeds 
￿10 billion for the first time. 
1997  Another record year beats the £10 billion 
barrier. Exits down with flotations only two 
Neuer Markt launched in Germany for smaller 
companies. Geberit Beteiligungs was  
  25
thirds of previous year. New trend of privately 
sourced deals exceed U.K. divestments.  
Continental buyout market receives increasing 
focus. 
Switzerland’s largest buyout (￿1.3 billion). 
Deal numbers across CE exceed 500 for first 
time.  
1998  Growth of IBOs and MBIs lead the third 
successive record market value year at £14.5 
billion.  PTPs  
responsible for 20%of value.  Trade sales 
reach record high, but flotations continue to 
fall. 
Tecnologistica (Italy) was the first tertiary 
buyout in CE. Deal value exceeds ￿20 billion 
for first  
time. The second highest number of buyouts 
from family firms is recorded. MBIs become a 
major feature of market. 
1999  Buyouts over £100 million reach record 
numbers to boost value to another record £16.8 
billion. PTPs account for a quarter of market 
value; deals under £5 million drop by a third.  
Exits slow, particularly flotations.  Emergence 
of US fund interest.  
Andritz largest buyout in Austria (￿481 
million) 
2000  At £23.9 billion market is more than four times 
1995 value, but depressed number of smaller 
and mid-market deals. Family/private deals 
lowest since 1986. PTPs smash previous 
record.  Receivership show largest increase in 
exits.  15,000 buyouts recorded by CMBOR. 
First £3bn deal (MEPC/Leconport, £3.5 
billion) 
Dyno Nobel was Norway’s biggest buyout 
(￿680 million). Alfa Laval was Sweden’s 
largest buyout (￿1.6 billion). Euronext formed 
in September in order to take advantage of the 
harmonization of the European Union financial 
markets.  
2001  Value falls 20% to £19.2 billion as mega deals 
disappear and PTPs slow. Big drop in trade 
sales emphasize exit difficulties but funds 
raised boom to an even higher amount. 
Eircom Ireland’s largest buyout (￿4.8 billion). 
Cognis Holland’s biggest buyout (￿2.5 billion). 
Basel II deliberations begin. Kabel 
Deutschland CEs largest secondary (￿2.1 
billion). 
2002  Further fall in volume, value down another 
20%.  Large deals and PTPs disappearing.  
Buyouts still account for nearly half of M&A 
activity. Trade sales continue to drop, but 
receiverships and secondary buyouts 
increasing. 
Neuer Markt closes after losing 95% of its 
value in 2.5 years. Legrand was largest buyout 
in France (￿5.1 billion). Telediffusion de 
France was largest privatisation (￿2.4 billion). 
No. of buyouts from the high technology 
sectors at their highest. 
2003  Buyout market stabilises: 6 percent increase in 
value; 8%increase in volume. PTPs highest for 
three years.  Exits still flat but secondary 
buyouts almost equal to trade sales. 
There were more buyouts originating from the 
business services sector than in any other year. 
2004  Year ends strongly with second highest ever 
value of £20.1 billion.  Mega deals bounce 
back with 47 above £100 million.  Record exits 
largely due to secondary buyouts.  Fund 
raising lowest since 1996. 20,000 buyouts 
recorded by CMBOR. 
Record value of buyouts in Germany (￿17.9 
billion). Celanese was largest ever German 
buyout (￿3.1 billion). CBR first German 
buyout over ￿1 billion. Deal value across CE 
exceeds ￿50 billion for first time. 
2005  Another strong year with highest ever value at 
£24.2 billion. Buyouts over £100 million a 
record 49.  Highest number of exits with 
secondary buyouts highest recorded. First 
buyout financed by Hedge Fund. 
There were 694 buyouts with a combined value 
of ￿88.7 billion. Record number of buyouts in 
Germany (113). SBS Broadcasting Belgium’s 
largest buyout (￿2.1 billion). Wind 
Telecommunications was Italy’s largest buyout 
(￿12.1 billion). Amadeus was Spain’s largest 
buyout (￿4.3 billion). Sanitec was Finland’s 
biggest deal (￿1 billion). Frans Bonhomme and 
Eau Ecarlate (both France) were the first 
quaternary buyouts. Highest number of buyouts 
from family firms. 
2006  Slow start, especially in deal value.  TDC of Denmark becomes largest ever buyout 
in the whole of Europe including the U.K. (￿13 
billion).  
Source: CMBOR  
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Table 3: European Buyout Funds Raised and Invested (￿m) 
 
  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004 
           
Funds Raised - CE 











           
Funds Invested – CE 











Source: EVCA. U.K. in parentheses 
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Table 4: Premiums paid above market price to take a firm private: US and U.K. 
studies compared 
 
Study  Sample 
period/ 
country  
Type  of 
Deal 




























MBO  28  56.0%  N.A.  N.A. 
Torabzadeh and Bertin (1987)  1982-85 
US 
ALL  48 
 






Lehn and Poulsen (1989)  1980-87 
US 
ALL  244 
 






Amihud (1989)  1983-86 
US 
MBO  15  42.9%  -20,0 days  19.60%
*** 
Kaplan (1989)  1980-85 
US 
MBO  76  42.3%  -40,60 days  26.00%
*** 
 




ALL  80 
 










ALL  47  37.9%  N.A.  N.A. 
Slovin, Sushka and Bendeck (1991)  1980-88 
US 










MBO  114 
 
N.A.  -1,0 days 





Frankfurter and Gunay (1992)  1979-84 
US 
MBO  110 
 






Travlos and Cornett (1993)  1975-83 
US 
ALL  56 
 











MBO  50 
 










ALL  121  44.9%  N.A.  N.A. 




MBO  184  32.9%  N.A. 
 
N.A. 




ALL  187 
 











ALL  323 
 










ALL  95  44.9%  N.A.  N.A. 




ALL  177 
 













* stand for statistical significant at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. ALL = all going private deals. MBO = 




Table 5: Total Value Realised for U.K. Buyouts/Buy-ins 
 














1997  6801  87%  12%  1% 
1998  6283  70%  28%  2% 
1999  8471  77%  12%  11% 
2000  16736  59%  25%  16% 
2001  18179  47%  23%  30% 
2002  17587  62%  21%  17% 
2003  13417  66%  19%  15% 
2004  34258  53%  30%  17% 
2005  40533  54%  31%  15% 
Source: CMBOR/Barclays Private Equity/Deloitte 
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Table 6: Comparison of Factors Affecting MBO Market Development in Europe 
 
Panel A: Supply of opportunities 
  UK  France  Germany  CEE 
Need to deal with family 
succession problems 
Moderate need  High need  High need  Low  need 











established in early 
2000s 




programme from 1980s; 
now complete 
Less extensive than 
UK 





Scope for ‘going-private’ 
transactions 
Large stock market; 
few initial deals now 
significant 
Steady flow but 
often family control 
issues 
Relatively small 






Development stage of M&A 
markets 
Highly developed  Relatively active  Becoming active  Relatively active 
 
Panel B: Demand for private equity 
  UK  France  Germany  CEE 
Attitude to 
entrepreneurial risk 
Was very positive from 
early 1980s 




Willingness of managers to 
buy  
High  Moderate  Starting to develop  High, but lacking 
financial means. 
 
Panel C: Infrastructure to complete deals 
 
Panel D: Realization of Gains 
  UK  France  Germany  CEE 
Stock markets  Receptive to private 
equity cos. From mid-





New issues sparse; 






Trade sales  Highly active  Becoming more 
active especially 
for partial sales 





Increasing interest  Favoured route  Possible route  Possible exit route 
Source: CMBOR 
 
  UK  France  Germany  CEE 
Private Equity and Venture 
Capital market 
Grew rapidly from 
early 1980s 
Grew from late 
1980s but many 
small players 
Traditionally small 




Supply of debt 
 
High  High  Tradition of high 
leverage 
Low but growing 
Intermediaries network 
 
Highly developed  Moderately 
developed 
Fragmented  Highly developed 
Favourability of legal 
framework 
 
Favourable  Favourable  Moderately 
favourable 
Favourable 
Favourability of taxation 
regime 
 
Favourable  Favourable  Reforms in progress  Moving to 
favourable with EU 
reforms  
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Source: CMBOR/Barclays Private Equity/Deloitte 
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Equity Mezzanine Debt Other UK Interest Rates
Source: CMBOR/Barclays Private Equity/Deloitte 
 
 









































Trade Sale Flotation MBO/MBI Receivership
 Source: CMBOR/Barclays Private Equity/Deloitte 
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Fig. 7: Buyouts as a Percentage of GDP 
 


















Source: CMBOR/Barclays Private Equity/Deloitte and OECD Statistics 
 